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Introduction
In any civilized society the most important
task is achieving a proper balance between
freedom and order. In wartime, reason and
history both suggest that this balance shifts to
some degree in favor of order—in favor of the
government's ability to deal with conditions
that threaten the national well-being.1
William H. Rehnquist
The terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, and the subsequent echoes of al-Qa'eda2 inspired murder from "Bali to
Turkey to Kenya to Spain"3 to London,4 has
spawned an international "war"5 that pits the
United States and its allies against the forces
of a "virtual"6 State. In this, of course, rests
the dilemma which confronts the United
States and its allies—although al-Qa'eda
clearly receives support from certain nations,7
it is not a nation-state.8 Among other things,
this means that the rules for fighting the War
on Terror are facing challenges not yet fully
appreciated (or anticipated) by international
law, let alone domestic law.9 Nevertheless, as
various issues present themselves, e.g., use of
force, detention of enemy combatants, etc.,
the policy and legal considerations must be
framed within the existing rule of law.
One issue that has received much attention
in the context of the interrogation of suspect-
ed terrorists10 is the improper use of rendi-
tion,11 where some allege that the United
States' sends detainees to third nations where
they are subjected to interrogations that
employ torture or other illegal techniques.12
Like allegations of torture, charges of ille-
gal rendition roll off the tongue with ease and
are raised by a variety of individuals and
interest groups,13 including Amnesty
International.14 For instance, in May 2005,
Amnesty International issued a human rights
report that reserved its most scathing criticism
for the United States, claiming that the United
States ignored international law and had cre-
ated a network of supplicant countries to
"subcontract" illegal detention and mistreat-
ment.15
Whatever one may think of the efficacy of
Amnesty International in the cause of promot-
ing war avoidance and human rights, evaluat-
ing whether such allegations are true or not
requires a lucid understanding of the applica-
ble legal standards associated with rendition.
Recognizing that the practice of sending cer-
tain individuals to third nations for question-
ing or detention is not itself illegal, it is imper-
ative that one view allegations of illegal ren-
dition with a clear understanding of the appli-
cable legal standards set out in law. Only then
can one set aside the rhetoric and objectively
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establish whether or not the United States
stands in violation of the rule of law. 16 The
purpose of this article is to briefly examine the
primary international legal instrument dealing
with illegal rendition.
Defining Illegal Rendition 
Was I sent [to Syria] by the Canadians and
Americans so they could get information out
of me using methods that would be prohibited
here?17
Maher Arar 
The primary international instrument dealing
with the practice of illegal rendition is the
1984 United Nations Convention Against
Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture
Convention).18 Article 3 of the Torture
Convention makes it unlawful for any State
Party to "expel, return ("refouler") or extradite
any person to another State where there are
substantial grounds"19 to believe that the per-
son will be subjected to torture.20
In order to understand whether a State is
engaged in illegal rendition, it is necessary to
first define the terms "torture"21 and "other
acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment."22 A reading of the Torture
Convention reveals that the document does
not exhibit the same precision in defining
what it means by "other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment as it does
with regard to torture."23 The Torture
Convention defines torture as follows:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suf-
fering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a con-
fession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is sus-
pected of having committed, or intim-
idating or coercing him or a third per-
son, or for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind when such
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of…a public official or
other person acting in a public capaci-
ty. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or inci-
dental to lawful sanctions.24
In summary, for torture to exist in the con-
text of an interrogation, the criteria can be
broken down as follows: First, the action must
be based on an intentional act; second, the
action must be performed by an agent of the
State; third, the action must cause severe pain
or suffering to body or mind; and fourth, the
action must be accomplished with the intent to
gain information or a confession. In adopting
the Torture Convention, the United States
Senate provided the following reservations
which require specific intent and better
defines the concept of mental suffering:
[T]he United States understands that,
in order to constitute torture, an act
must be specifically intended to inflict
severe or mental pain or suffering and
that mental pain or suffering refers to
prolonged mental harm caused by or
resulting from: (1) the intentional
infliction or threatened infliction of
severe physical pain or suffering; (2)
the administration or application, or
threatened administration or applica-
tion, of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the sense or the personali-
ty; (3) the threat of imminent death; or
(4) the threat that another person will
imminently be subject to death, or
severe physical pain or suffering, or
the administration or application of
mind altering substances calculated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or per-
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sonality.25
Article 2 of the Torture Convention is sig-
nificant because it absolutely excludes the
defense of exceptional circumstances to justi-
fy torture.26 "No exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat
of war, internal political instability or any
other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification for torture."27
In contrast to defining torture, the compan-
ion phrase "other acts of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment,"28 e.g.,
"ill-treatment,"29 is not defined in the Torture
Convention.30 The Torture Convention cer-
tainly obliges each State party to the docu-
ment to "undertake to prevent…other acts of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment,"31 but Article 16 of the Torture
Convention is the only part of the treaty that
addresses the consequences to a nation that
engages in ill-treatment.32 In turn, interroga-
tion practices that do not rise to the level of
ill-treatment may be repugnant by degree but
would be perfectly legal under international
law. 
But how does a State Party determine if
sending an individual to a third State would be
legal or illegal under the Torture Convention?
In determining whether or not to send an indi-
vidual to a third State for the purpose of
detention or questioning, for example, the
State Party is required at Article 3(2) "to take
into account all relevant considerations"33
with particular emphasis to whether or not
there exists "a consistent pattern of gross, fla-
grant or mass violations of human rights
[emphasis added]."34
Obviously, the standard for action in the
Torture Convention provides a wide amount
of latitude for the State Party. The combined
factors of "substantial grounds" with "a con-
sistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass viola-
tions of human rights"35 allows considerable
flexibility for a State Party to justify a partic-
ular rendition. Thus, although the prohibition
on illegal rendition is firmly established, the
standard of evaluation is a rather subjective
one. Certainly, one could argue that any
nation that the United States' executive branch
lists as a "terrorist nation" would probably
serve as prime instance of a nation that
employs torture.36 In this light, receiving
"assurances from Syria"37 that it would not
engage in torture were an individual delivered
to it is clearly problematic. Furthermore,
Congress regularly lists nations that it consid-
ers to be in gross violation of human rights for
the purposes of providing foreign aid.38 This
list would also strongly indicate a prohibited
State. Apparently, on a case-by-case basis, the
United States does seek letters of assurance
from receiving States that the person so ren-
dered will not be subjected to torture or ill-
treatment. Indeed, the federal standard for
determining whether a particular rendition
will stand in violation of the Torture
Convention is whether it is "more likely than
not"39 that the individual will be tortured by
the receiving State.40
If the test for illegal rendition in the context
of torture is hazy, the matter is far more disap-
pointing vis a vis rendition to a nation that
practices ill-treatment. Inexplicably, Article
16 of the Torture Convention has no similar
requirement for a State Party that might con-
template rendering an individual to a third
State that practices ill-treatment.41 In short,
this might mean that a State Party to the
Torture Convention is absolutely free to hand
over an individual to a State that it knows
engages in ill-treatment!42
In addition to the lack of definition of the
concept of ill-treatment (or of even a mini-
mum level of sanction in the Torture
Convention), the entire definitional issue is
further aggravated by a controversial and
often cited European Court of Human Rights43
ruling entitled Ireland v. United Kingdom.44
The Ireland court specifically found certain
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interrogation practices by British law enforce-
ment agents used in Northern Ireland to be
"inhuman and degrading,"45 i.e., ill-treatment
under the European Convention on Human
Rights, but not severe enough to rise to the
level of torture in the Torture Convention.
According to the Ireland court, the finding of
ill-treatment rather than torture "derives prin-
cipally from a difference in the intensity of the
suffering inflicted."46 The use of five inves-
tigative measures called the "the five tech-
niques"47 were evaluated. These involved such
actions as prolonged standing, hooding, and
deprivation of sleep and food.48
Conclusion
All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for
good men to do nothing.49
Edmund Burke 
When one addresses emotionally charged
issues such as torture or illegal rendition, it is
imperative that the discussion center on the
applicable legal standard for the practice, the
major gauge set out in the Torture Con-
vention. The purpose of detainee interroga-
tion, whether it is done domestically or via
rendition, is to glean as much valuable intelli-
gence as possible in order to blunt the murder-
ous machinations of those associated with the
al-Qa'eda terrorist network. The al-Qa'eda
will not be kept at bay without the use of intel-
ligence gathering which includes interroga-
tion. 
The quote by former Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist cited at the beginning of this
article reminds those living in a free society
that achieving a proper balance between free-
dom and order in time of national crisis
requires a shift, to some degree, to measures
associated with increased security. 50 While
those who accuse the United States of "betray-
ing American values by outsourcing interro-
gation to countries notorious for torture"51 cer-
tainly have the right to make such accusations,
the question of illegality—not weltanschau-
ung—is really the touchstone. Is the United
States acting in violation of the applicable
international rule of law?
On the other hand, weighing the credibility
of the allegations of illegal rendition is not
simply understanding the rule of law—one
must have sufficient facts to plug into the
equation. Unfortunately, this is a difficult task
since most of the media reports about illegal
rendition cases cite unnamed sources and
anecdotal evidence as proof. Moreover, the
dilemma of separating fact from speculation is
further aggravated by the government's under-
standable penchant for secrecy in prosecuting
the War on Terror. To its credit, the govern-
ment has admitted numerous crimes, errors,
and missteps by its agents,52 but it steadfastly
denies a systemic policy of illegality in terms
of the treatment of detainees and the issue of
illegal rendition.53 From the inception of the
War on Terror, the White House has repeated-
ly assured the public that the United States is
"in full compliance with international law
dealing with torture,"54 and that wherever
detainees are being held they are all treated
"humanely, in a manner consistent with the
third Geneva Convention."55
At the end of the day, the chief enforcement
tool has always been America's commitment
to the rule of law coupled with the judgment
of its citizens. Accordingly, it is imperative
that the judgment of the people be rooted, so
far as possible, in the facts and the applicable
rule of law. In short, the actual rule of law
regarding rendition as set out in the Torture
Convention leaves much discretion to the
Party State. While one can certainly agree that
the rule is a prime candidate for revision, it
does not follow that free license is given to
critics to assert that the United States is cur-
rently violating the rule. n
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